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Abstract 
If our sense of happiness is closely connected to brain functions, it might become possible to 
manipulate our brain in a much more refined and effective way than current methods allow. In this 
paper I will make some remarks on the manipulation of the sense of happiness and illuminate the 
relationship between human dignity and happiness. The President’s Council on Bioethics discusses 
this topic in the 2003 report Beyond Therapy, and concludes that the use of SSRIs might make us 
“feel happy for no good reason at all, or happy even when there remains much in one’s life to be 
truly unhappy about.” I will extend their line of thought through two thought experiments. In the 
first, a “perfect happiness” drug is given to a person, and in the second a happiness device with an 
on/off switch is placed inside a person. The first case leads us to conclude that a life with dignity 
means a life free from domination by the sense of happiness and the sense of unhappiness. The 
second case leads us to conclude that a life with dignity requires substantive freedom to choose 
unhappiness. At the end of this paper, I present a new interpretation of “human dignity,” that is, “a 
life with dignity means a life in which we are able to explore our own life, equipped with both 
happiness and unhappiness, without regret, through relationships with others, without being 
exploited by the desires of anyone, and without being dominated by our own desires.” 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Happiness has long been regarded as one of the highest goals in human life. 
If our sense of happiness is closely connected to brain functions, future methods 
may allow us to control happiness through refined, effective brain 
manipulation.
1    Can we regard such happiness as true happiness? In this paper I 
will make some remarks on the manipulation of the sense of happiness and 
illuminate the relationship between human dignity and happiness. 
Philosophers have attributed two aspects to happiness: subjective happiness 
and objective happiness. Most of us tend to interpret happiness as a subjective 
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mental state, or a sense of happiness. We can see a typical example of this line of 
thought in J. S. Mill’s Utilitarianism: 
 
By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by 
unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.
2 
 
Mill describes happiness as an inner mental state defined by pleasure or pain. 
What he means here is the sense of happiness. In contrast, Aristotle and other 
philosophers argue that happiness consists not only of inner states, but also of 
outer contexts which are shaped by our relationships with loved ones, our career, 
lucky events in our lives, etc. Aristotle writes in Nicomachean Ethics that 
“happiness . . . is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.”
3 
And he concludes: 
 
Why then should we not say that he is happy who is active in accordance 
with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not 
for some chance period but throughout a complete life?
4 
 
According to Aristotle, happiness (eudaimonia) is “action itself” that is in 
accordance with complete virtue throughout a complete life, and the sense of 
happiness (pleasure) is an accompaniment to this action.
5  
In this paper I am going to shed light on subjective happiness, that is to say, 
the sense of happiness, because when we use the word “happiness” today we 
mean the sense of happiness, in most cases, and because it is considered to be 
the sense of happiness that could be influenced by brain manipulations.
6 
 
2. A Thought Experiment on a Happiness Drug 
 
The President’s Council on Bioethics’s 2003 report Beyond Therapy includes 
an extensive discussion of the morality of mood-improvement drugs such as 
SSRIs (Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors). The report argues that while 
                                                      
2  Mill (1972), p.7. 
3  Aristotle (1941), p.942 (1097b:20). 
4 Ibid.,  p.948  (1101a:15). 
5 Ibid.,  p.945  (1099a:10-20). 
6  At the end of this paper, readers may notice that the author’s idea of happiness is rather close to that 
of Aristotle.   3
SSRIs can help patients live a better life by inducing calm, providing a 
background of well-being, and changing personality,
7 such drugs create some 
fundamental ethical problems. First, one might come to “feel happy for no good 
reason at all, or happy even when there remains much in one’s life to be truly 
unhappy about.”
8 Second, “SSRIs may generally dull our capacity to feel 
[psychic pain], rendering us less capable of experiencing and learning from 
misfortune or tragedy or empathizing with the miseries of others.”
9 And third, 
those drugs “might shrink our capacity for true human flourishing.”
10 To 
conclude, the report recommends those drugs be “sparingly” used so that we 
“are able to feel joy at joyous events and sadness at sad ones.”
11 
The Council’s argument was made from the perspective of conservative or 
communitarian ethics, and it has been harshly criticized by proponents of 
technological advances as being overly sentimental. I do not think such 
criticisms are completely off the mark; however, their report was stimulating for 
me because it contained an interesting and fundamental discussion about why 
the extreme pursuit of a sense of happiness should be restrained. This can be 
found particularly where the report talks about feeling happy for no good reason 
at all, and about feeling joy at joyous events and sadness at sad ones. 
In order to further develop their argument, here I would like to make a 
thought experiment. Suppose we have a perfect happiness drug without any side 
effects, and, having taken that drug, the user is filled with a sense of happiness 
for a couple of days regardless of his or her experiences. Imagine a parent is 
walking on the street with his or her little child. Suddenly a runaway car crushes 
the child to death. The parent becomes severely shocked and panicked. The 
ambulance crew checks out the parent’s mental condition and lets the parent take 
a perfect happiness drug. The heart of the parent soon becomes filled with a 
sense of happiness. The parent says, “Today my child was killed, but how happy 
I am now!” and smiles back to the crew. 
Although the parent claims he/she is happy, we would all agree that 
something strange is happening. This is a typical example of Beyond Therapy’s 
case in which a person feels “happy when there remains much in one’s life to be 
truly unhappy about.” I believe this case is problematic because the parent is 
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totally under the control of a perfect happiness drug and is deprived of his/her 
“freedom to feel unhappiness” at such a sad event. Even in this situation the 
parent may still have a rational capacity to judge that, for ordinary people, this 
situation would be a tragedy, but since the parent’s emotion is dominated by a 
feeling of happiness caused by the drug, there are no choices but to keep on 
enjoying happiness for a couple of days. The parent might hope to continue to 
take the drug every other day to experience everlasting, drug-induced happiness 
and avoid the harsh realities she would normally be faced with. 
 
3. Human Dignity and the Sense of Happiness 
 
Don C. Des Jarlais, while talking about “externally induced pleasure,” writes 
that the Puritan tradition includes “the belief that the pleasure will be so intense 
that the individual will not be able to control the desire to repeat the sensation 
and will become enslaved to it.”
12 Can this kind of enslavement actually be 
found in the case of “externally induced happiness” described above? I argue 
“yes.” 
Immanuel Kant clearly distinguishes “the principle of morality” from “the 
principle of happiness” and gives the former the first priority. Allen Wood 
interprets Kant’s idea of happiness as a combination of “pleasure, contentment 
with one’s state and desire-satisfaction.”
13 According to my interpretation of 
Kant, the state of drug-induced happiness should not be considered a primary 
end for humans because it lacks a fundamental moral duty, the duty to cultivate 
one’s own perfection.
14 
Let us take another example. Imagine that a woman who has been forcibly 
injected with a perfect happiness drug is raped, or a man who has been forcibly 
injected with a drug is tortured. The most brutal of human deeds are being 
forced on them, but during those periods they feel tremendous happiness caused 
by the drug. In these cases no one would say, “They are happy, so there is no 
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problem.” Most people would feel that an extraordinary humiliation is being 
committed against them. In these cases they are deprived of their “freedom to 
feel unhappiness,” and they are deprived of something that cannot be described 
except by the term “human dignity” in exchange for drug-induced happiness.
15  
Leon R. Kass suggests that when we are in a state of drug-induced euphoria 
we are deprived of “human dignity,” but he does not clarify the relationship 
between human dignity and happiness.
16 If my intuition is correct, the central 
problem of drug-induced happiness lies in the deprivation of human dignity in 
exchange for happiness. Then, what is human dignity?
17  
It is Kant who examined human dignity most deeply in terms of philosophy. 
Kant defines dignity as “an absolute inner worth” that exists inside every 
rational person, and no one is allowed to destroy it. According to Kant, we have 
the duty to pay mutual respect to each other’s human dignity. We must not 
deprive others of the inner freedom that is the endowment of every rational 
person.
18 
 
 [A human being’s duty] consists, therefore, in a prohibition against 
depriving himself of the prerogative of a moral being, that of acting in 
accordance with principles, that is, inner freedom, and so making himself 
a plaything of the mere inclinations and hence a thing.
19 
 
Kant says that one’s duty to oneself consists in a prohibition against making 
oneself a plaything of mere inclinations. This is a truly persuasive argument 
regarding human dignity, because the essence of human dignity must be 
considered to be never to deal with a person as a thing. Thus, it seems that the 
domination of a person by drug-induced happiness should be regarded as a clear 
violation of human dignity, because it is equal to debasing a person to a 
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plaything of inclinations.
 Hence, in the above case, human dignity in Kant’s 
sense is considered to have been taken from them in exchange for a sense of 
happiness induced by a drug.   
Let us go on further. In the above case, those people are deprived of the 
“freedom to feel unhappiness” and are degraded to a plaything of mere 
inclinations; hence, they are considered to be devoid of “human dignity.” This 
means that a life with dignity necessarily requires that one’s “freedom to feel 
unhappiness” be totally guaranteed in one’s actual life. “A life with dignity” 
means a life that is not dominated by the sense of happiness.   
A life with dignity has two characteristics:   
First, as has already been discussed above, a life with dignity is free from 
domination by a sense of happiness, regardless of whether or not it is acquired 
by means of drugs. Moreover, a life with dignity should also be free from 
domination by our own strong desire to experience that kind of happiness. The 
former domination comes from the outside and the latter originates from inside 
oneself. Although mentioning the latter desires might sound too ascetic in the 
case of tobacco or alcohol, I believe one important essence of a life with dignity 
should exist here. 
Second, a life with dignity is free from domination by the sense of 
unhappiness.
20  This idea is more familiar to us than the first. A life with dignity 
should be free from the domination of negative thoughts about one’s existence 
or one’s own value. People sometimes fall victim to this kind of self-negation 
when experiencing such hardships as severe and repeated abuse, the death of 
loved ones, or devastating disasters. In these cases, human dignity means the 
belief that whatever their suffering and hardships, all human beings have a 
possibility to escape from domination by the sense of unhappiness and to regain 
the sense of self-affirmation at some point in their future life. Hence it might be 
allowed to use SSRIs to medically support this recovery process for a limited 
period of time, paying special attention to the danger of domination by a sense 
of happiness. We share the same conclusion with the President’s Council Report 
on this point. 
I would like to make a close examination of this issue. In the thought 
experiment discussed before, the heart of a person who was in the depths of 
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despair is filled with a sense of happiness caused by a perfect happiness drug. As 
a result, a drug-induced happiness dominates the person, and he/she is deprived 
of a life with dignity. Then what should we think about giving that person 
another drug that is not as strong as a perfect happiness drug, removing despair 
and the sense of unhappiness from the person, and creating a mental state that is 
kept away from both unhappiness and happiness?   
My answer is that such medication has both an affirmative aspect and a 
negative aspect that need further examination. With regard to the former, a 
person who was dominated by despair and the sense of unhappiness becomes 
able to escape from that mental state and to begin an effort to regain the sense of 
self-affirmation. If such medication can provide the person with an opportunity 
to explore his/her life with a sense of affirmation, it should be considered good 
news. This is not deprivation of human dignity, because it enables that person to 
escape from the domination of the sense of unhappiness. Hence, I do not claim 
that the use of existing psychoactive drugs such as SSRIs immediately deprives 
us of human dignity, or that its use ought to be prohibited. What I raise an alarm 
over is the use of a hypothetical perfect happiness drug that could fill our heart 
with complete happiness, and what I have done so far has been a philosophical 
investigation of the relationship between human dignity and the manipulation of 
the sense of happiness, using a perfect happiness drug as an example. 
The negative aspect that needs further examination concerns the dependency 
of drug users on that imperfect happiness drug. Once refraining from using that 
drug, that person would fall into the depths of despair and unhappiness again. 
This shows that the person cannot stand on his/her own legs without depending 
upon the medication. This leads us to the question whether this should really be 
considered a life with dignity. I am going to think about this at the end of the 
paper. 
From our discussion so far, I conclude that one important aspect of human 
dignity can be explained in relation to the sense of happiness and unhappiness. A 
life with dignity means a life free from the domination of both the sense of 
happiness and the sense of unhappiness. 
We could even go on to argue that a life with dignity means a life in which 
the author of one’s own life is never dominated by the desires of outside people 
or by desires inside one’s own body and mind. And a life with dignity as 
interpreted above can serve as a firm ground on which one can survive one’s 
whole life with self-affirmation and without regret, whatever else may be   8
brutally destroyed. (I once called it “the central axis.”
21) To summarize, a life 
with dignity means a life free from domination by the sense of happiness or 
unhappiness and free from domination by any kinds of desire inside and outside 
oneself; in other words, a life through which we can keep away from domination 
by the sense of happiness, the sense of unhappiness, or desires. Here, Kantian 
ideas seem to meet Asian Buddhist traditions.
22 
I agree with Kant that humans have an inevitable inclination to promote our 
own happiness. We must remember that we live in a pleasure-seeking 
civilization, urged on by advanced scientific technologies that did not exist in 
Kant’s time. In such a civilization what we really have to accomplish is not to 
pursue the promotion of happiness by increasing the amount of pleasure, but to 
pursue a life with dignity that is not controlled by our desire to seek pleasure and 
a sense of happiness.
23 
Some might argue that people ought to have the freedom to choose a life 
dominated by a sense of happiness, even if it is achieved through happiness 
drugs. This is an argument in favor of the freedom to choose a life deprived of 
human dignity.
24 Some might further ask, “What is ‘wrong’ with drug-induced 
happiness if that state of mind can last indefinitely without any side effects and 
without any harm to others? You may say it is a life deprived of human dignity, 
but I prefer a life filled with continuous happiness.”   
I am inclined to say yes to this argument because I believe we have a right to 
do foolish things insofar as it does not harm others. At the same time, ironically, 
this reminds me of J.S. Mill: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a 
pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”
25 Mill 
would probably comment that the above choice has to be guaranteed as freedom 
but it does not lead to a superior life. 
                                                      
21  Morioka (2003, 2005).   
22  These desires I have just mentioned include desires for a variety of enhancements, so the ultimate 
freedom in the age of enhancement is the freedom of being liberated from the obsessive desire for 
enhancement. This is again where contemporary bioethics meets Buddhist thoughts. 
23  This sentiment is also discussed from a different angle in my book Painless Civilization. In this 
book I called our pleasure-seeking civilization “painless civilization.” The problem of desire discussed 
above is very important for our discussion, however, it goes beyond the scope of this paper; hence I 
would like to leave it to our future research. 
24  However, although “the freedom to choose a life dominated by a sense of happiness” seems similar 
to “the freedom to feel unhappiness,” there is a significant difference between them in that, while the 
former is exercised to escape from a life with dignity, the latter is exercised to acquire it against the 
domination of the sense of happiness. 
25  Mill (1972), p.10.   9
My argument resembles that of conservative bioethics because both stress 
the importance of human dignity in the discussion of bioethics. However, with 
regard to freedom, conservative bioethicists would be reluctant to agree with me 
in terms of my discussions of the freedom to choose a life dominated by the 
sense of happiness and the freedom to become unhappy. 
 
4. A Thought Experiment on a Happiness Device 
 
So far I have presupposed that “having the freedom to feel unhappiness” and 
“being free from domination by a sense of happiness” mean the same thing in 
our context, but is this correct? Here I would like to make another thought 
experiment. Imagine that a small device that can achieve the same effect as a 
perfect happiness drug is placed inside the human brain. The person has a switch 
on his/her hand, and when this person turns on the switch he/she is forcibly 
filled with a sense of happiness, and when this person turns off the switch he/she 
comes back to a normal mental state. We can say this person has the freedom to 
turn the switch both on and off, that is to say, freedom to experience a sense of 
machine-made happiness and freedom to stop experiencing it. 
What happens when this person turns on the switch when raped or tortured? 
After turning it on, this person is suddenly filled with tremendous happiness, and 
the happiness is so great that this person might never come to think of turning 
off the switch. The person might hope to keep enjoying machine-made 
happiness forever, and might never intend to come back to the original mental 
state. In this case, this person maintains a freedom to turn it off, but he/she never 
wishes to exercise that freedom.
26 We could say in this case that this person 
suffers from a kind of addiction to this device. 
In the case of a perfect happiness drug, the person is forced to experience 
drug-induced happiness and has no alternative but to continue experiencing it 
for a couple of days. However, in the case of a happiness device, the person has 
the freedom to turn off the switch and escape from machine-made happiness 
anytime, so the situation looks completely different.   
I am inclined to think that in the latter case, although the person has a 
“formal freedom” to turn off the switch, he/she is under the domination of 
overwhelming machine-made happiness, and therefore is deprived of a 
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“substantive freedom” to turn it off; hence, the person is considered to be 
deprived of human dignity. The former is the case in which both freedom and 
human dignity are taken away, and the latter is the case in which “formal 
freedom” exists but “substantive freedom” and “human dignity” are taken away. 
This analysis suggests that in order to protect our human dignity it is 
necessary to be “free from domination by a sense of happiness,” and that in 
order to be free from its domination, not only “having a formal freedom to feel 
unhappiness” but also “having a substantive freedom to feel unhappiness” ought 
to be guaranteed. What would Kant think about this? Let us cite his argument 
again: “[A human being’s duty] consists, therefore, in a prohibition against 
depriving himself of the prerogative of a moral being, that of acting in 
accordance with principles, that is, inner freedom, and so making himself a 
plaything of the mere inclinations and hence a thing.” Reading his words, it 
seems to me that he regards the inner freedom to act in accordance with 
principles not just as formal freedom but also as substantive freedom. Therefore 
I suspect that Kant would also claim that in order to protect human dignity 
“substantive freedom to feel unhappiness” ought to be guaranteed. 
Let us further examine the cases in which there exists formal freedom but 
not substantive freedom. In the second thought experiment, a freedom both to 
switch on and off was given to the person. However, once the person turns the 
switch on, he/she is forced to be in a situation in which he/she is never going to 
turn the switch off again. Here we have a strange system that works in such a 
way that only the ON button is always going to be chosen, although every time 
there remains the other alternative. In this system the switch and the human 
brain are directly connected. This is a system in which, before turning it on, the 
formal freedom to choose whether to switch on or off is being given to the 
person, but once it is turned on, the substantive freedom to switch off is lost to 
that person forever. 
The most similar phenomenon to this system would be “addiction.” Taking 
the example of tobacco, a person who has never experienced it has a substantive 
freedom to choose whether or not to begin to smoke. However, once beginning 
to smoke and getting addicted to tobacco, that person loses the substantive 
freedom to quit smoking through his/her own efforts. Actually, tobacco has the 
function of producing pleasure substances in the brain; it looks similar to the 
happiness drug in the first thought experiment. A heavy smoker lights cigarettes 
one after another incessantly. This is just like continually turning on the switch   11
of a happiness device. The most perfectly working machine in this way would 
be a happiness device such as that presented in our second thought experiment. I 
would like to call a system in which the substantive freedom to turn off the 
switch is lost after turning it on an “addictive system.” The problem of the 
relationship between “domination by the sense of happiness caused by drugs or 
devices” and “human dignity” is closely connected with the question “What is 
an addictive system?”   
An addictive system has an imperfect stage and a perfect stage. The 
imperfect stage is a stage in which a person sometimes wants to escape from the 
addiction but is unable to find a way to do that. It is just like the case in which a 
person wants to quit smoking but cannot. On the other hand, the perfect stage is 
one in which a person in addiction never thinks of escaping from his/her 
condition anymore. It is just like the case in which a person never thinks of 
quitting tobacco, whatever bad effects he/she might suffer from. A perfect 
happiness drug or a happiness device has the capacity to lead people to this stage 
immediately. 
I have previously discussed the possibility of giving a person a drug that is 
not as strong as a perfect happiness drug, which removes despair and the sense 
of unhappiness from the person, and creates a mental state that is kept away 
from both unhappiness and happiness. In that discussion I have pointed out that 
there is a negative aspect that needs further examination, and this negative 
aspect is the problem of addiction. A person who has been keeping away from 
continuous unhappiness thanks to drugs might fall into the depths of despair 
again after using up the medication. Thinking of such devastation, that person 
would probably become unable to dispense with the medication, and as a result, 
would effectively become addicted to it. What should we think about this? 
A life that is dominated by the sense of unhappiness or self-negation is never 
a life with dignity.
27  It is not wrong to escape from such a mental state by using 
drugs. Of course, we have to say that a person suffers from addiction to a drug if 
his/her mental state of being kept away from both unhappiness and happiness 
cannot be maintained without it. Nevertheless, in this case, thanks to the drug, 
that person is given the capability to proceed to live his/her whole life without 
regret; hence, this addiction is not considered to deprive him/her of human 
dignity. My conclusion is that this is nothing but an addiction, but human dignity 
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is protected in this case. 
Then what about replacing this drug with a perfect happiness drug and 
putting that person under the domination of the sense of happiness? I do not 
think it is a life with dignity, because that person is under the control of the 
sense of happiness, has no alternative but to affirm the status quo, and loses the 
motivation to explore his/her own life filled with ups and downs without regret. 
A life with dignity means a life in which we are able to explore our own life, 
equipped with both happiness and unhappiness, without regret, through 
relationships with others, without being exploited by the desires of anyone, and 
without being dominated by our own desires. This is the idea of “human dignity” 
I have found after examining Kant’s idea of dignity and the manipulation of the 
sense of happiness. 
In this paper I started with Kant’s idea of human dignity, and through the 
examination of a happiness drug and a happiness device, I have discovered a 
new idea of human dignity just mentioned above. By this, I think, we have 
reached a solid ground on which we can think about “human dignity” in the age 
of biotechnology in a way a little different from Kant. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As a conclusion, I would like to write the following things. First, “human 
dignity” can be defined as being free from the domination of the sense of 
happiness, the sense of unhappiness, or desires. Second, with regard to 
happiness caused by drugs or devices, 1) we do not have to reject it if it can save 
people from the depths of despair and help create the ground on which they can 
live their own life without regret, and 2) we have to reject it if the happiness 
caused by drugs or devices dominates our hearts. A human completely filled 
with happiness appears to be in the greatest fortune at first sight, but to be filled 
with the sense of happiness to the extent that the person cannot turn off the 
switch, overwhelmed by tremendous happiness, is nothing but the theft of 
human dignity from that person. I believe one of the reasons why we have a 
vague anxiety about the development of happiness drugs is that we intuitively 
anticipate that such a kind of disappearance of human dignity will be inevitably 
awaiting us in the future of advanced biotechnology. 
I would like also to stress that the topic discussed in this paper is one of the 
central issues in the philosophy of life as a discipline that we have proposed   13
since the establishment of Journal of Philosophy of Life in 2011.
28 The 
relationship between happiness and human dignity in the age of advanced 
technology would not be able to be fully investigated without the comprehensive 
perspective that is given by the discipline of philosophy of life. It is time to 
create in contemporary philosophy a new research field, the philosophy of life.
29 
 
* This paper is a revised and enlarged version of my presentation at the 2011 
Carnegie-Uehiro-Oxford Conference on “Shaping Moral Psychology,” New York, 
November 8–9, 2011. My presentation at the conference was funded by The Uehiro 
Foundation on Ethics and Education. 
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